ABSTRACT
Since the ancient Greeks there has been a strand of philosophical thought which holds that the moral character of a work is internally related to its value as art. In its most extreme forms moralism imperialistically swamps the recognition of virtually every other artistic value – giving rise to the puritanical evaluation of works wholly on the basis of moral criteria. Immoralism is the claim that a work's value as art can be enhanced in virtue of its immoral character. Cognitive immoralism holds that this is so because imaginatively experiencing morally defective cognitive-affective responses and attitudes in ways that are morally problematic can deepen one's understanding and appreciation. It follows that morally problematic cognitive-affective responses to works can be epistemically virtuous because they may deepen our understanding and appreciation. Where this is the case, the value of the work is enhanced. Thus cognitive immoralism holds and ethicism cannot but be false.
