ABSTRACT
The, terms "justified," "justification," and their cognates are most naturally understood in what people may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. The most natural way of construing the justification of beliefs is in parallel fashion. There are many locutions that encourage people to think of believing as subject to requirement, prohibition, and permission. A libertarian will, no doubt, maintain that if deontological concepts are to apply to believings in the same way as to overt actions, then all of his conditions for freedom will have to apply to believings as well. In religion, philosophy, and high level scientific matters it is often the case that, so far as one can see, the relevant arguments do not definitively settle the matter one way or the other. The above account in terms of comparative subjective probability might be correct for all our cases, theoretical and practical.
