ABSTRACT
Welton presents us with a comprehensive account and constructive critique of Husserl's philosophy organized around the latter's conception of method. The work is comprehensive in two senses: it touches the whole range of problems central to Husserl's philosophical pursuits, and it scans Husserl's entire career. The standard interpretation, Welton claims, is found in the convergence of the interpretations advanced by analytic philosophers who appropriate from Husserl positions helpful in addressing their own issues and by both deconstructionists and critical theorists who reject central tenets of Husserl's philosophy. Husserl's problem is not his understanding of transcendental phenomenology but his understanding of phenomenological psychology. Welton, by accepting the identification of phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, understands the Cartesian approach to phenomenology as claiming just the same field of research as phenomenological psychology. Husserl's reflections on time-consciousness call into question, not the moment of apodicticity within Husserl's Cartesianism, but the extent of that apodicticity.
