ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses some standard accounting of Frege’s contribution to modern logic, and considers the role played in Frege’s revolution by his approach to the logic of judgment. It consider the role of the judgment stroke in that theory, surveying both apologist and critical positions. The chapter takes up Frege’s proposed paraphrase of the stroke, together with redundancy issues raised by the failure of that paraphrase. The failure of the paraphrase exhibits a limit in the expressive power of the judgment-stroke itself, and in this sense a principled limit on Frege’s logic of judgment. The chapter proposes an interpretation of these limits, drawing on two claims from Heidegger’s philosophical logic. Frege, in his mature writings, comes to recognize a principled bound on the expressive capacity of logic. This thought is perhaps most familiar and explicit in Frege’s writings as the doctrine of the indefinability of truth.
