ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Becker’s role regarding Husserl’s psychological phenomenology, Becker’s relation to Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, and Becker’s reception of logical intuitionism. The discussion-triangle Husserl-Weyl-Becker documents that Husserl is familiar with the discussion surrounding Brouwer and intuitionism at least since circa 1918. In addition, it is safe to assume that Husserl also regards Weyl’s and Becker’s critiques of formalism and positivism undoubtedly as the fulfillment of basic “phenomenological” thoughts. Becker formulates his fundamental thesis in the field of the philosophy of mathematics according to which intuitionism is coupled with an anthropological foundation, whereas Hilbert’s formalism is coupled with an absolute foundation of mathematics. Becker’s achievement of clarity and the significant role of phenomenology have been explicitly acknowledged by intuitionism. Becker interprets Brouwer’s logical intuitionism in the sense of the principle of phenomenological access. In the history of philosophy, realism is said to correspond to formalism and thus to the logic of consequence, and idealism to intuitionism.
