ABSTRACT
The Party apparat and the military fully dominate the Soviet defense and strategic policy process and jealously guard their prerogatives, keeping the defense intellectuals and the think tanks at arm's length. The defense intellectuals radically redefined the traditional ideas and policies of war and strategy in the United States: The central theoretical-methodological concept for the management of this nuclear strategic system derived from the deterrence paradigm, which was developed by the defense intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s. The problem derives from the perceived logic and dynamics of the nuclear deterrence system; the problem derives from the methods and policies developed for the management of this system. The assessment of the legacy of the defense intellectuals, the architects of the deterrence system, leads one to rather melancholy conclusions. The vastly differing views of the scholars and experts who have contributed to this volume reflect the uncertainties and absence of a strategic consensus that characterize contemporary thinking about nuclear deterrence theory.
