ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology of the horizons of subjectivity and seeks to the world-horizon. The concept of the horizon derives from the Greek verb horizein, which one could roughly translate as “to divide,” “to delimit,” or “to mark off by boundaries.” While medieval philosophy determined the concept of the horizon either metaphysically or anthropologically, in modern philosophy the horizon became an epistemological concept. As far as Edmund Husserl’s static phenomenology of the horizon is concerned, the most elaborate analysis is to be found in Ideen I. The intentional object’s outer-horizon also calls for both a noetic and noematic clarification. When the further development of Husserl’s phenomenology of the horizons is taken into account, one can identify two chief limitations of Husserl’s static phenomenology of the horizons. For Husserl, horizon-intentionality is a characteristic of horizon-consciousness. However, static and genetic methods determine horizon-consciousness in significantly different ways.
