ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author assumes that the rich ontology of intentional states that was the major concern of the middle period has been already sufficiently presented in the previous parts. For a long time, the philosophical significance of Franz Brentano has been reduced to being the most important teacher of Edmund Husserl. True enough, the phenomenon of intentionality has been intensively investigated by medieval philosophers, and also, the majority of analyses that reader find in works of Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant revolve around the issues concerning intentionality. By the way, the inner perception is the only mental phenomena that really deserves the name "perception". The logical parts of an entity Brentano describes as parts of a definition in Aristotle’s sense. In this sense, in a concrete human being there are logical parts such as “animal”, “mammal” or “primate”. Brentano distinguishes, finally, the notion of metaphysical parts, which correspond to the Aristotelian notions of substance and accident.
