ABSTRACT
Phenomenology arises precisely from a radicalization of Ernst Mach’s and Ewald Hering’s method, which was a reaction against the bottomlessness of theorizing in the exact sciences by means of mathematical speculations and of concepts remote from intuition. British empiricism is nevertheless “an unclear and half-way intuitionism”, insofar as it does not adhere to its own principle, according to which one must always go back to the experience, viz. to the grasping of something itself, and refrain from stating anything that is not drawn from intuition. Husserl argues that Hume “indicated the way of all inquiry into origins” with “principle of tracing back every cognition to ‘impressions’”, and understands the return to the origins just as a return from ideas to impressions. Husserl’s introspective conception of phenomenology is affected – via Brentano – by Locke’s psychological interpretation of reflection as internal perception and rests upon incorrect presumption that acts and sensations belong to sensuousness, hence immanent perception is sensuous perception.
