ABSTRACT
In this chapter we will introduce and synthetise the sociology of emotions of Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian sociologist whose work is now forgotten, but who played a fundamental role first in the development of sociological positivism, and then later in structural functionalism. Indeed, Talcott Parsons included Pareto among the four classical thinkers (together with Marshall, Durkheim and Weber) whose work has made it possible to overcome the hermeneutical limits of utilitarian philosophy (Parsons, 1949. The Structure of Social Action, Second Edition. Glencoe IL: The Free Press).
As is typical of classic sociologists, Pareto did not dedicate a systematic analysis to the sociology of emotions. But, unlike other classical thinkers, he considered emotionally driven actions as the most relevant part of human behaviour. The main thesis in his famous treatise on The Mind and Society (1935) is that there is “a group of constant and generalized sentiments” determining human life. Consequently, he tried to offer an embryonic sociological analysis of how people experience “collective sentiments” (called residues) and how they hide their manifestation by using different forms of verbal justification (called derivations).
In the discussion, we will show how Pareto’s approach to emotions is important because it is focused on the social construction of feelings and emotions, and because it clearly distinguishes instincts, feelings and emotional displays. Nevertheless, given the historical and intellectual context, Pareto’s sociology of emotions has its limits, in terms of: imprecision of terminology; contrast between logic and emotions; and the consequent inattention to the dimensions of subjectivity, the cultural definition of emotions, and their situational regulation.
