ABSTRACT
Social science theory ought to shed light on the behavior of proliferating states after they develop nuclear weapons. Optimism about proliferation rests on two pillars, one theoretical and one empirical. In theoretical terms, the central logic of rational deterrence theory gives good ground for being confident about nuclear proliferation: rational states will not go to war if their enemies can convince them that the expected costs of doing so will far exceed the expected benefits. Rational deterrence theory (rdt) is not, of course, without its detractors. Rdt enthusiasts admit the theory is still under development; critics argue it is deeply flawed. The empirical pillar of proliferation optimism lends apparently confirmatory support to the claims of rational deterrence theory, at least with respect to nuclear weapons. Nuclear operations refers to the day to day management of nuclear weapons and the doctrinal concepts by which the military use nuclear weapons in peacetime and combat.
