ABSTRACT
This chapter points to two connotations of the concept of ‘life.’ Life can either refer to the natural phenomenon of organic life studied by the ‘life sciences’ and the philosophy of nature, or it may equally refer to the lives we lead in a complex lifeworld. Of course, natural features belong to the lifeworld as well. However, the lifeworld is also shaped by various individual and cultural practices and, as such, it is not reducible to the natural. I defend a twofold claim: first, a genuine interest in the lifeworld informs Classical German Philosophy throughout on a meta-level; second, it is this interest in the lifeworld that grounds and motivates considerations of natural phenomena in Classical German Philosophy. I trace the shared interest in the lifeworld from Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte back to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's formative ideas. Jacobi profoundly influenced the debates in Classical German Philosophy with his ‘resolute realism.’
