ABSTRACT
An overlap can often be seen between state and sports law systems. This overlap, which can concern both the matter ruled upon and the norms adopted, is not without problems, due to the distinctive features characterizing these legal systems. Before entering into an in-depth analysis of this overlap and its consequences, we’ll outline the distinctive features of the sports law system, as well as the difference existing between the sports law and state law systems. We will then examine the case of doping in greater depth, as it is truly emblematic. First, we shall analyse the rules put in place by the sports law system. Beside these regulations, there are state regulations on doping, as well as international conventions, such as the European Anti-Doping Convention (which came into force on 1 March 1990) and the UNESCO Convention, whose main achievement is that of substantial uniformity in handling cases throughout the state law systems where the Convention came into force. The analysis of the doping regulations put in place by sports law systems highlights several legal issues, due to their very strict and not wholly unproblematic nature.
The same occurs as concerns state rules on doping, due essentially to the substantial lack of regulatory competence in the field of sports, as may be seen in many states. After analysing the issues of state regulations, we will focus on the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport, whose text reveals several additional legal issues, especially as relates to its definition of doping, which is substantially the same as that of the first version of the WADA Code. An overlap between the different legal systems emerges from this brief, certainly not exhaustive, analysis of the doping regulatory framework (in both state and sports law). In this regard, we wonder whether this substantial overlap between the sports law system's definition of doping and that of state law systems might not give rise to a true legal aberration. Moreover, one wonders whether this overlap might not conceal another, more important issue, such as opening a way towards an ethical characterization of law that, de facto, denies one of the fundamental and distinctive features of law, as has been outlined since the Enlightenment.
