ABSTRACT
Saperstein: Referring to Mr. Voigt’s discussion of the contradictory but simultaneous needs for deterrence on the one hand and damage limitation and conflict cessation on the other, it would seem to be assumed that punishment is a necessary part of deterrence. One can identify two kinds of deterrence: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Punishment says, “if you attack me I will bomb and destroy your country”. Denial basically says, “I will keep you off of my territory or I will destroy your forces on my territory”. The assumption that denial is not an effective deterrent seems to be made consistently. I think we should examine this assumption more carefully because it is not completely obvious. Let me take a hypothetical situation. Let us presume that the Soviet Union unilaterally attacks the West, that its armies pour over the borders into the West, and that those armies are then completely destroyed. Is it really that obvious that this in itself would not cause severe difficulties in the Soviet Union? Is the prospect of the destruction of its armies not, in itself, a deterrent? The usual assumption is that if we destroy invading armies they will build up and invade again. We should seriously question this assumption in terms of the possibilities for major political transformations in any country whose armies are destroyed in the process of invasion. I don’t have the answers to that but I think it is a question that has to be addressed more carefully than it has been up untill now.
