ABSTRACT
Anselm Müller takes up a thought by G.E.M. Anscombe—namely, the point of a virtue can be “super-utilitarian and thus mystical.” Against the background of this claim, Müller rejects Ph. Foot’s suggestion that all virtues can be understood as Aristotelian necessities. While Müller is probably right in his criticism, he does not say much to enhance our understanding of “mystical virtues.” In this chapter, I will attempt to clarify the teleological structure of ethical virtue and thereby come to a better understanding of what might be mystical about some virtues—or perhaps about virtue in general. In doing so, this chapter draws heavily on a Wittgensteinian conception of practice. The general claim is that even if it is true that the virtues are Aristotelian necessities, this does not per se determine the point of virtue. The point of virtue is not to be found outside virtue itself. This super-utilitarian teleology essentially determines the mystical point of virtue.
