ABSTRACT
The period of Napoleonic warfare has been generally considered to be a useful beginning for students of modern strategy. In contrast to the limited wars of manoeuvre which characterised the conflicts between the absolute monarchs of the previous century, Napoleonic warfare presaged total war, being characterised by the dynamic of escalation rather than the habit of moderation. Strategy in the middle of the nineteenth century was marked by the advent of a phenomenon which has been a dominating consideration since the Second World War, that is, the problem of accommodating the problem of continuous technological innovation into existing strategic concepts. Many of the strategic writings of the early post-war period have a rather underdeveloped tone. In the West there was a good deal of untutored technological and political speculation about the “Russian threat” and the “ultimate weapon”. The nuclear strategists shared a common understanding of the “real world” which they sought to analyse and, sometimes, to influence.
