ABSTRACT
Studies on the transformations of the inter-institutional balance at regional level triggered by the constitutional reforms of 1999 and of 2001 abound. This contribution aims, first, to reconstruct this scholarly debate especially for a non-Italian audience, highlighting similarities and differences of the Italian approach on regional “forms of government” in relation to the comparative legal scholarship on subnational constitutionalism. Second, it critically analyses the current traits of the inter-institutional balance at regional level in between ordinary regions and regions with special status. Third, the chapter assesses the relationship between the developments in the regional forms of government and democratic accountability from three perspectives: 1) the accomplished reform at regional level, in continuity with the local electoral law passed in 1993 and the repeatedly failed attempts to replicate a similar modification of the form of government at national level; 2) the design and practice of the interinstitutional relationships in the regions, in particular amongst the President, the government and the legislative Assembly; 3) the regional sources of law and their autonomy. It concludes that twenty years after the reforms the attempt to streamline the accountability chain in the regions in favour of their Presidents has been achieved, but the over-strengthening of the executive has led to an excessive imbalance in the relationship between the President and, respectively, the Assembly and the people.
