In this chapter, I consider problems and solutions for an act theoretic account of propositions. I discuss the relation between the primary source of intentionality, namely tokens of propositional acts or propositional acts simpliciter, and their representations, and I propose a measure-theoretic representation of propositional acts. On this basis, I will argue for a Hanks-like conception of propositional acts as forceful acts. Propositional acts are forceful not only because they are truth-apt but moreover because they are bearers of rational commitments and entitlements. I will point out some undesirable consequences of adopting force cancellation or simulation contexts. These are that there seems to be an uncontrolled proliferation of force cancellation or simulation contexts, as suggested by the cases of probability judgments, comparative probability judgments, comparative preference directives, and the like. One might be dissatisfied with the lack of a unified account of what a cancellation context is supposed to be. I propose to liberate propositional acts so that they can be performed with a variety of forces, such as conditional assertion, disjunctive assertion, modified by degrees assertion, etc. On the basis of a measurement theoretic representation of propositions, I propose the notion of act by surrogates to account for target-shifting in propositional acts.