ABSTRACT
Perceptions can err on the side of either complacency about threats or exaggeration of them. A good deal of commentary in the field of arms control alleges that alarmism is the more frequent error. The concept of an action-reaction cycle in an arms race is closely associated with this view and with the consequent belief that better information would have a moderating effect. The study of military doctrine ought to be particularly useful through the Soviet Union, a nation peculiarly deferential to explicit doctrines and compulsively dutiful in justifying all action on a theoretical basis. The rundown of the Korean War, the death of Stalin and the Khrushchev-Bulganin peace offensive were, however, soon to alter the context and provide a reminder that the worst-case solution to the uncertainties of threat analysis is never available for long in consumer democracies. Certain broad assumptions about the Soviet military outlook did underlie the belief that American nuclear policy would suffice.
