ABSTRACT
Carl von Clausewitz would have been only mildly surprised at an Antipodean bicentennial celebration of his birth on June 1, 1780. The triumphs of the natural scientists and the modest victories of the social ones made strategic studies intellectually and militarily respectable. Russian and Chinese strategies for conventional and unconventional war have apparently changed little since the 1950’s. The years since Clausewitz's death on November 16, 1831 have seen two more military intellectual crises. Many of the resulting intellectual problems are discussed in a forthcoming expansion of and commentary on Edward Meade Earle's Makers of Modem Strategy. But by 1970 some gulfs seemed clearly apparent, to use Clausewitz's analogy, between the "analytical labyrinth" of some specialized military intellectuals and the strategic "facts of life". There was little immediate debate on the Anglo-American shift to the strategic defensive at “the culminating point of victory”.
