ABSTRACT
The United States and the Soviet Union made important progress towards common positions on anti-satellite activities (ASAT) arms control in their negotiations during 1978—79. Those talks are now in abeyance, but in the interim neither side has advanced its ASAT weapon programme significantly. Thus the prospects for ASAT arms control remain good. While the body of current international law protecting satellites is substantial, it cannot halt ASAT competition for it does not prohibit all ASAT testing and deployment. Satellites are attractive targets because they are relatively few in number, are vital components of military forces, and are relatively vulnerable to a variety of weapons. Both the USA and the USSR have justified their ASAT programmes by citing the need to attack satellites engaged in hostile acts and to retaliate against the other’s ASAT attacks. It is not feasible to prohibit satellites from performing all military-related functions or hostile acts. If ASAT competition is to be averted, the USA and the USSR must be convinced that competition would be potentially destabilizing and unjustifiably costly, and that ASATs are neither an adequate way nor the only way to cope with threats from satellites. In drafting an ASAT treaty, a series of issues must be resolved, including the scope of an ASAT ban, provisions regarding hostile acts by satellites, opening the accord to third parties, and verification of compliance and dismantling. A Soviet draft treaty banning all weapons from orbit, placed before the 36th UN General Assembly, has its flaws. But as an indicator of continuing US and Soviet interests in the ASAT threat, it is an encouraging sign; the prospects for ASAT arms control remain good.
