ABSTRACT
Theism says that the world exists because God chose to actualise it. Axiarchism is a novel, a-personal alternative to theism. According to this view, the world exists because it is better that it be actualised than that it not be actualised. Axiarchism is initially attractive because, by replacing a personal God with the a-personal, creatively effective ethical requirement, it appears to explain the existence of the world without facing challenges that theism faces such as the problem of evil and the modal problem of evil. In this chapter, however, Nagasawa argues that theism is, overall, more compelling than axiarchism. First, he argues that axiarchism cannot avoid either the problem of evil or the modal problem of evil because there are versions of the same problems that apply to it as well. Second, he argues that axiarchism cannot respond to these problems as effectively as theism can. Third, and finally, he argues that if axiarchism tries to respond to these problems by assimilating theistic responses, it collapses into theism. That is, there will be no difference between axiarchism and theism.
