ABSTRACT
Kripke distinguishes between using a description to fix the reference of an expression and using it to give its meaning. Kaplan and Stalnaker then articulated a distinction between semantics and metasemantics or foundational semantics , ascribing complementary roles to each. Metasemantic debates presuppose views on the underlying semantic facts. They thereby also presuppose views about what languages are. On the Austinian metasemantic picture for linguistic types that the author assumes, languages are social tools devised for communicative purposes. Conventions concerning the specific lexical items and constructions of a particular language, grounded on a subpersonal combinatorial linguistic competence driven by our biology, assign to sentence-types semantic contents that it is apt to characterize as “speech-act potentials”. Contemporary semanticists assign some semantic significance to at least the three moods apparently present in all languages: declarative, interrogative, and imperative. The declarative, interrogative, and imperative moods are identified by morphosyntactic paradigms and functional roles.
