ABSTRACT
In philosophy of language, the view that proper names should be analyzed as variables is known as variabilism. While similar in certain respects, this view stands in opposition to millianism, which for long has been the predominant view of proper names. According to millianism, the meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its reference. That is, the meaning of a name is the individual to which it refers. Millianism had been the subject of severe criticisms by chiefly Frege and Russell who both favored a descriptivist analysis, that is, an analysis where names are treated essentially as definite descriptions. Predicative uses of names present an immediate problem for millianism. After all, since these names denote properties, this directly contradicts the claim that the meaning of a name is its reference. If names are variables that range over individuals, there is no prima facie reason to assume that such variables cannot be bound.
