ABSTRACT
Consider two platitudes about truth and knowledge. First, knowledge is of truths. It isn't possible to know what isn't so. Second, knowledge is based on truths. It isn't possible to acquire knowledge by drawing inferences from falsehoods. Both claims have come in for criticism in the recent literature. A familiar case has to do with approximations, claims that are thought to be close enough for some purposes without being true. Scientists, some say, know things that are only approximately true. That's supposed to show that knowledge isn't always of truths. It's not clear that these arguments from approximation show what they're supposed to show. Arguments from approximate truth don't undermine the (apparent) platitudes about knowledge and truth. They suffer from two closely related problems having to do with the attitudes that rational scientists would take toward these contents and the standards used for determining whether these contents are true. The traditional picture of knowledge might only be approximately true. On this occasion, it holds up well.
