ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses a question that Aristotle discusses in Posterior Analytics II 17-8: can the same demonstrable attribute be explained by different causes? It begins by disambiguating the question into three different versions and then proceeds to answer them, with a particular focus on the third version: can the same demonstrable attribute be explained by different, exclusive causes for different subjects? This chapter argues that Aristotle presents three distinct answers to this question, depending on the nature of the subjects involved. If the subjects are different species of a genus to which the demonstrable attribute belongs as a commensurately universal feature, then the answer is “no”. If the subjects are (1) a species of a genus to which the demonstrable attribute belongs as a commensurately universal feature and (2) the genus itself, then the answer is “yes”. Finally, if the subjects are different species that are not members of a genus to which the demonstrable attribute belongs as a commensurately universal feature, then the answer again is “yes”. This chapter defends this interpretation through a line-by-line reading of Posterior Analytics II 17-8.
