ABSTRACT
In Aristotle’s natural world, substances are characterized by hylomorphic unity, while the divine unity of Aristotle’s unmoved mover is not hylomorphic. But what is hylomorphic unity, and what, accordingly, is non-hylomorphic unity? On one understanding of hylomorphism, the genuine unity of hylomorphic substances requires that there be no ontological distinction between matter and form but only a conceptual distinction. On another understanding, their unity requires that they be related to something that lacks any ontological distinction, namely form. I argue that these two accounts of hylomorphic unity both have the problematic implication that Aristotle’s God is a unity in the same sense as certain natural unities. Aristotle, by contrast, maintains that unity has many senses and does not apply univocally between divine and natural objects. Whereas focusing on ontological simplicity in general as characteristic of unity leads us to connect the divine with the forms of natural objects, focusing instead on the more specific nature of divine unity according to Aristotle leads us to see life as that part of the natural world that most images the divine.
