ABSTRACT
The philosophical validity of meditation is the central issue of this Handbook. The nature of the self has been a metaphysical puzzle in Western philosophy for centuries. In Indian philosophy, both issues have always been related, and continue as such to the present. Now, both traditions engage each other in their analysis. A paradox arises, however, when connecting two related claims: (a) meditation, as an attention-training discipline, appears to increase the extent to which practitioners can control their mental states; (b) as practitioners increase control, they experience a diminishing sense of self as a substantive entity, and appear to be approaching a type of agentless agency. Agentless agency, however, seems oxymoronic. This chapter reviews how four philosophers, Thomas Metzinger, Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas, and Rick Repetti, have addressed this dilemma along distinct lines, and charts out a path through its horns, but one that results in a new dilemma, but one only facing Repetti’s account. By applying philosophical analysis to the claims these four philosophers make about the later, successful stages of meditation practice, and by examining those stages and their alleged benefits, the philosophical validity of meditation practice, and of its analysis, ought to become clear.
