ABSTRACT
This chapter traces how Stimmung was introduced as a philosophical concept at the turn to the 20th century in order to show how the term combined the semantic fields of atmosphere and feeling. In virtue of being atmospheric and felt, Stimmung signifies affective phenomena that go beyond the distinctions of objective and subjective, internal and external, mental and bodily; phenomena that are essential shareable and have collectivising power. This chapter examines forgotten sources to draw a systematic conclusion. Despite a rich history of emotion research since Antiquity, Stimmungen first became a topic of scientific interest at the end of the 19th century. The term was introduced in the context of aesthetic experience—e.g., relating to artworks (Riegel, Geiger) and landscapes (Simmel)—and was only later transferred to psychic life (Scheler). Another trail (Bergson, Dilthey) connects Stimmungen with life power (Lebenskraft) and life feelings (Lebensgefühle), identifying them as the source of life forms and world views. Common to those accounts, Stimmungen are seen as serving a communal function, facilitating the communality of various modes of affectedness (from single objects via situational constellations to encompassing worldviews), and thereby, establishing and confining corresponding social collectives.
