ABSTRACT
Philosophers interested in our sense of diachronic identity have typically emphasized that it relies on some form of psychological continuity. Traditionally, they have insisted on the continuity constituted by memory and, more generally, Mental Time Travel (MTT). More recently, the continuity characteristic of the stream of consciousness has also been emphasized. Focusing on these two kinds of continuity may foster an inaccurate picture of our sense of diachronic identity, however. Some data indeed suggest that what is most important in this sense are rather long-standing character and personality traits. In this chapter, my aim is to build bridges between recent approaches that emphasize the role of character and personality traits and more traditional accounts that give pride of place to MTT and/or the stream of consciousness. In Section 1, I present data suggesting that memory is less important for our sense of personal identity than the preservation of character and personality traits. Next, in Section 2 and Section 3, I lay out an account of these traits according to which they are multitrack dispositions whose central manifestations are emotions – for that reason, moral and personality traits are constituents of the affective self. If this is along the right track, emotions have an important influence on our sense of diachronic identity. But how do emotions relate to the two kinds of continuity introduced earlier? Section 4 explores how emotions impact the stream of consciousness. I argue that the processual nature of emotions supports the conclusion that they are crucial contributors to the sense of identity characteristic of the stream of consciousness. In Section 5, I explore how emotions relate to the sense of identity generated by MTT. Considering the role of emotions at the time of encoding and at the time of remembering, I conclude that emotions are central determinants of the sense of continuity generated by MTT.
