ABSTRACT
Cats and dogs are the same kind of thing in being mammals, even if cats are not a kind of dog. In the same way, remembering and imagining might be the same kind of mental state, even if remembering is not a kind of imagining. This chapter explores whether episodic remembering, on the one hand, and future- and counterfactual-directed imagistic imagining, on the other, may be the same kind of mental state in being instances of the same cognitive attitude. I outline a continuist position where all three involve the same judgement-like attitude and compare its advantages to a discontinuist alternative where remembering requires use of its own distinctive attitude. Reasons are given for favouring a version of the continuist position, though this chapter’s focus is on the metatheoretical questions of how to go about understanding remembering in terms of a content and attitude pair and of which considerations are relevant when deciding among competing content/attitude pairs.
