ABSTRACT
“Middle powers,” variously defined, have served relevant and significant roles in the post-WWII regional and global orders, facilitated by structural conditions of “long peace” among great powers and proactive leadership by and among creative middle powers. Within the complex post-war security order in the Asia Pacific, “middle powers” such as Australia, Canada, South Korea once had the “space” to engage the non-likeminded and advance multilateralism at official and unofficial (Track 2) levels with the benefit of security guarantees from the United States. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case. The two major regional powers are effectively closing this space by characterizing their rivalry as a contest of values and a confrontation of “existential threats,” securitizing trade and technology domains, and seeking to selectively decouple their economies. This has complicated policy choices for middle power Asia-Pacific states whose priorities are to avoid being forced to choose sides. While the Biden administration has brought a welcome change in tone to its regional alliance relationships, it has not altered but rather intensified its policies of “extreme, strategic competition” towards China. Beijing for its part has adopted increasingly assertive economic and security policies through strident “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy as it seeks to reinforce Xi Jinping’s domestic control and achieve its ambitions as a global power. Faced with the conflicting priorities of their economic and security dependencies, South Korea, Australia, and Canada must redefine and reorient their policies if they are to sustain their middle power roles in a structurally evolving Asia-Pacific order.
