ABSTRACT
The existing literature has tended to describe secondary and middle powers as shrewd brokers who are able to evaluate and calculate costs and risks, choosing a hedging policy to maximize their gains and avoid risk. However, empirical evidence has demonstrated in recent years that when a state’s security and economy are highly dependent on two great powers, it has no choice but to adopt policies that have the appearance of a hedging strategy but are contradictory in nature. This article investigates secondary powers under this dilemma via a new concept called a “reluctant hedging policy” that diverges from the existing concept of hedging by exploring the motivations of states. To capture the essence of reluctant hedging, this article examines the case of South Korea as it faced pressure from both the United States and China before and after its deployment of the THAAD system. In keeping with the definition of a reluctant hedging policy, the motivation behind Seoul’s contradictory policies was not to hedge against choosing the wrong side but to maintain the existing structure of security dependence on the United States and economic dependence on China.
