ABSTRACT
This study explores the theory of routine activities and its analytical potential to improve our understanding about the set of circumstances surrounding match-fixing in Brazilian football. This theory investigates the macro processes that may explain criminal events, which brings together three elements in the Brazilian case: (a) motivated offenders: (i) local bettors who seek out sports professionals to fix matches to obtain personal gains related to betting and (ii) organized international groups (i.e., syndicates) specialized in match-fixing; (b) available victims: (i) referees who act in the first divisions of the Brazilian League and (ii) athletes who play in lower divisions; and (c) a lack of surveillance: (i) difficulties in policing and investigation, (ii) matches not monitored by sports betting monitoring systems, and (iii) non-televised matches. The theoretical framework used in this paper allows for contemplating strategies and policies to face this particular social problem that are not exclusively focused on tools aimed at punishing offenders, even though legal enforcement could be understood as a fundamental deterrent. It supports the defense of reformulating institutional and organizational standards, the development of preventive and pedagogical actions, and the development of a better system for whistleblowers to come forward.
