We focus on the international proliferation of alternative justice mechanisms developed since the early 2000s to fight corporate crime, particularly those involving corruption offenses. We examine how political science and sociology can explain the spread of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), and similar instruments in various OECD jurisdictions. DPAs now allow states to suspend and eventually rescind criminal proceedings against businesses, without formal recognition of criminal liability. We critically review the functionalist explanation to account for the adoption of the DPAs, which have many controversial features, according to specialized legal literature. If the weaknesses of a functionalist explanation are established, how then can we best explain the diffusion of DPAs? Two alternative approaches in political science are first examined: coercion in international relations (with the extraterritoriality of American law) and the business power model in political economy. We then venture into sociological explanations based on normative and mimetic isomorphism.