ABSTRACT
I take up the question how, according to Husserl, instincts fit into the dimension of normativity. In particular, I argue that instincts can not only become subject to norms but also be constitutive of norms. My position relies on a reading of Husserl’s notion normativity that does not coincide perfectly with what has been called the “space of reasons.” This correlates with a respective Husserlian notion of reason that I take to be, despite some overlap, significantly different from more Kantian notions. I thus highlight those differences that I take to be most relevant to a richer understanding of instincts within the context of normativity. On the way, I also address some methodological concerns regarding the susceptibility of instincts to the phenomenological method, including the objection that the talk of “instincts” within phenomenology constitutes an illegitimate “naturalization” or, conversely, a “speculative mythologization,” which would contaminate a proper phenomenological understanding of normativity.
