ABSTRACT
This chapter develops a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s way of raising – and answering – the question about the sources of moral normativity. I argue that Korsgaard’s articulation of the normative question is framed by problematic presuppositions and that there is a need to phenomenologically pursue the question about the experiential sources of moral normativity: How do we experience morality as normative and what does its normative character consist in? Moreover, what is the difference between moral normativity and other kinds of nonmoral normativity that are regularly confused with morality? To motivate the need to pursue these questions, and to suggest a direction for elucidating them, I outline a phenomenological alternative to Korsgaard’s account. In contrast to Korsgaard and others, who conceive of normativity in terms of obligating authority, I suggest that the source of genuine moral normativity lies in our understanding of other persons as irreducibly significant, and that this understanding essentially involves and demands our love and concern for others. Furthermore, I argue that moral normativity must be distinguished from the kind of normative force that issues from our desire for social recognition and affirmation. I maintain that our susceptibility to the latter sort of normativity is egocentric and morally blind.
