ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that human embryos are human persons and demonstrates that the same features that make us persons also exist within the human embryo. I will argue that it is not so much our actual exercise of rationality that makes us persons, rather it is our inbuilt rational nature that makes us persons, whether or not we are able to exercise that rational nature at a particular moment in time. By carefully examining the inbuilt developmental tendencies of human embryos, I will argue that they also share in this rational nature and that, as a result, they are just as much persons as we are. To do this I will begin by examining competing Lockean accounts of personhood, detailing where they succeed and fail. In correcting the shortfallings of Lockean accounts of personhood, my own Aristotelian account of human nature will be explicated. Following that, I will demonstrate that human embryos share in our human nature. I will then demonstrate that human life has its own intrinsic value simply because it is human life. Given embryos are human beings, I will then conclude that the life of a human embryo has its own intrinsic value. Finally, I will respond to several objections based on contemporary embryology.
