ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the authors explain that Moscow’s support of the Cuban revolution was not only about sharing common communist ideology. It was also due to various political and military goals of the Kremlin’s strategy, not necessarily directly linked to the situation in Cuba. Hence, in exchange for Moscow investing heavily into the Cuban economy, the USSR obtained a possibility to resolve several military and strategic tasks by installing its military base just next to the US borders. After the disintegration of the USSR, the ideology and the army needs in the relationship between Havana and Moscow gave place to economic pragmatism. Modern Russia is very interested in recovering its role in the Cuban economy, benefiting from the scenario in which the Soviet Union produced plenty of industrial equipment still used in Cuba. For Russian companies, it is easy to upgrade the equipment. While the recuperation and transformation of the Cuban economy is a long process, the new Russian approach to Cuba does not intend to recreate the Soviet “satellite-state” model. Today, Moscow is hoping to re-establish its incidence in Cuba, which is expected to become a client paying its debts. Therefore, Vladimir Putin’s government is choosing the strategy of combining financial aid with capitalist economic pragmatism. At the same time, as the authors explain, the continuing tensions between the United States and Russia led to the growth of Cuban’s political significance for Russian foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. From this perspective, it is worth noting that the change in Russian relations with Cuba coincides with the shift in US policy toward Havana and Moscow.
