ABSTRACT
For Colombia, it did not pass unnoticed that, in Latin America, the three decades since the end of the Cold War were marked by the growing incidence of extra-hemispheric powers. One of them is Russia. The intensive contacts of Moscow with the leftist governments in the region in the context of an ongoing internal armed conflict in Colombia and the pivotal international support by Russia of Chavista’s Venezuela and Ortega’s Nicaragua, both harsh critics of Bogota’s position in the region, are just a few of several episodes, in which Russian interests clashed with that of Colombia. At the same time, neither Colombia nor Russia considered their bilateral relations a priority: Moscow and Bogota were looking to strengthen other pillars of their foreign policies. Yet, a proper examination of Colombo–Russian relations after 1991 offers an opportunity to understand better the true value of such “secondary” interactions between the great powers and actors in Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the ways to do so is to use the concept of symbolic reciprocity and a framework of analysis based on role theory and case studies. In this chapter, the author is paying particular attention to two episodes: First, interactions between Moscow and Bogota during the government of Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998), and relations between Colombia and Russia before and during the 2019 Venezuelan crisis that followed the proclamation of Juan Guadó Venezuela’s interim President.
