In this chapter, the author considers several different attitudes one can adopt towards canons in philosophy, and he does so by relating them to a variety of forms philosophical histories can take. By a ‘philosophical history’, he understands the investigation of some figure, topic or project in the history of philosophy that is meant to contribute to philosophy itself, as opposed to having mere historical significance. As his main illustration, the author considers several histories of analytic philosophy that contrast in their attitudes towards that tradition. But the notion of a ‘philosophical tradition’ plays a more general role as well, as does the related notion of a ‘philosophical practice’. Three of the author’s main contentions are: First, we should understand philosophical traditions and practices as containing more than theses and arguments, and in particular, additional normative elements meant to provide practical guidance. Second, we should conceive of traditions and practices as dynamic, that is as changing over time in substantive ways. Third, this provides a framework for thinking about different kinds of revisions in philosophical canons: from affirmative to moderately critical to revisionary.