ABSTRACT

In a famous debate between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, Popper accused Kuhn and Quine of propagating the ‘Myth of the Framework’: that some broad set of specific background commitments are required for interlocutors to be able to have a fruitful conversation. The Myth of the Framework could be used to argue for a beneficial version of the canon: that training in these shared background commitments allows for the growth of a robust community of inquiry. Popper argues, however, that the position that truth or inquiry can be framework-dependent is a pernicious form of relativism, and undermines the possibility of rational inquiry. The author subjects Popper’s view to criticism, showing that it can be used to undermine ‘orthodoxy’ and the canon in some ways, but that it props up the canon in others. In closing, the chapter examines the connections between Popper’s position on the community of inquiry and standpoint epistemology, and argues for the claim that Popper’s view, to be persuasive, requires a more robust account of how critical inquiry relies on the evaluative capacities of rational agents within a community.