ABSTRACT
The general topic up for discussion in this volume is the legitimacy of using certain 'mental' or 'psychological' terms in the explanation of goal-directed behavior. Moreover, note that it is almost entirely irrelevant what (if any) neurophysiological processes underlie the psychological dispositions or processes which the people cite in such explanations these have no bearing on what interests the reader. Few would deny that such a discovery would license existential commitment to representations: the realism is to be grounded in a 'physically structured object', and such objects seem unproblematically real, and the sorts of things that can contribute to causal explanations. ‘Intentions’ and ‘goal representations’ may thus be scientifically irrelevant, like ornaments; or they may be more like electrons, more like fuel-savers, or somewhere in between, like genes. The most striking difference between humans and other animals is the human capacity for language, and his use of tools.
