ABSTRACT
First, and most clearly: whether ‘the traditional goal concept, which involves internal representation of a desired or required state of affairs’ is necessary — as McFarland of course thinks it is not — in accounting for animal behavior. Second, slightly less clearly: what sort of ‘accounting for’ the people want ‘the traditional goal concept’ to provide. Third, less clearly still: whether non-intentional explanations (physiological; or mechanical-causal) could ever replace or substitute for explanations in intentional terms. ‘Natural kinds’ is an expression renowned for its vagueness. Without attention to such concerns, no systematic psychology of behavior will emerge. Montefiore and McFarland seem to be approaching agreement on at least one point: that intentions are needed for any adequate account of linguistic behavior. However that might be, one question has emerged as indissoluble, crucial, and critical: what counts as ‘realism’ in psychology.
