ABSTRACT
In this chapter I consider an argument that a moral concern for human well-being supports the position that a market in human organs is morally permissible. This argument is simple: That if such a market were to exist persons would consent to participate in it as organ buyers and organ sellers. We can infer from their consent to participate that they believe that this will make them better off. I consider two challenges to this argument: That the consent of some of the participants will not be genuine, as it will have been coerced, and that we cannot infer from a person’s participation in a market that she would prefer that market to exist rather than not exist. The first of these objections is unsound, but the second is sound. Rather than merely asking if a person would consent to transact in a market if it existed, we should also ask if she would consent for that market to be allowed. If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative, then we can infer that she would believe that she would be made better off by participating in the market. I argue that this could support allowing markets in some human organs.
