ABSTRACT
The chapter analyzes EU-level policies against disinformation and argues that two different approaches can be identified. On the one hand, the EU Commission understands disinformation as a problem of market failure, in which “bad” information is too cheap while good information is too “expensive”. Consequently, the chapter argues that the European Commission adopts an approach focused on modifying the incentive structure in the “market for information”. However, the Commission suspends judgment on the content of information and delegates this to fact-checkers. Conversely, the HRVP and the EEAS are more focused on achieving informational coherence and on sending the correct messages in the “information space”. The chapter relies on a process- tracing analysis of EU documents outlining plans and policies against disinformation. The analysis aims to trace the evolution of policies across time and to identify the type of measures proposed, the actor recommending it, and the differences between the premises underlying each set of measures.
