Causal and Non-Causal Aspects of Agency in Lowe's Ontology of Action

In this chapter I discuss a number of Lowe’s detailed claims concerning the causal and non-causal aspects of agency. In particular, (i) I offer arguments in favour of Lowe’s claim that, pace O’Connor, agents do not cause their volitions. (ii) I offer arguments against Lowe’s claim that the will is a non-causal power. I argue that rejecting this claim is pretty compatible with volitionism, and I offer an alternative account of volitions based on the metaphysics of powers. Although this account departs from Lowe in one crucial point, I show that if it is right, most of other Lowe’s claims concerning volitions turn out to be true; so I hope that the account I am defending here is able to accommodate most of fundamental insights of Lowe’s ontology of agency.