ABSTRACT

This chapter provides a concise introduction to Part 3 of the book. Its basic premise is that while constructing their antagonist postures, the Indian and Pakistani decision-makers incessantly refer to majoritarian hyper-nationalism with communal connotations. These official narratives are formulated on self-serving presupposition that the state faces persistent threat from unambiguously constructed enemies and there is a constant necessity to pacify and control them. Such approach has a direct impact on mutual, unalterably belligerent interactions between India and Pakistan, as the image of enemy is also intentionally personified by the neighbouring rival. Decoding the correlation between how both states ideologically construct and validate their foreign and domestic narratives, and the actual multi-layered, dismal results of persistent belligerence is a key prerequisite for understanding the current and future dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Such analysis enables to offer potentially constructive resolution proposals.

The overall assumptions formed around in the chapters of Part 3 of this monograph are as follows: (a) combative India's and Pakistan's policies serve only narrow beneficiaries and are crafted against the general interests of Indian and Pakistani citizens; (b) intentionally constructed and politicised animosities adversely affect the chances for bilateral and regional cooperation, indirectly foster democratic backsliding and provide framework for thriving political adherence to religiously motivated hyper-nationalism; (c) the ruling elites in both states are confronted with an urgent need to reconceptualise their mutual approach and stance towards Kashmir and Kashmiris and reframe major geopolitical objectives to adjust them to the challenges of the 21st century; (d) the inalienable rights of all residents of the erstwhile PSJ&K should be an inseparable part of multitrack frameworks for reconciliation initiatives, processes and political debates referring to the potential conflict resolution and future status of all chunks of Kashmir; and (e) the policies vis-à-vis Kashmir and the human rights situation in Indian- and Pakistani-administered parts should receive more international attention and resolution of this protracted conflict should be regarded as one of the fundamental contemporary security challenges.

Part 3 of this monograph is an IR (international relations)-based research which refers to current political and economic trajectories in Indo-Pakistani relations with special reference to Kashmir issue and applies selected conflict settlement approaches to empirical investigation of the Indo-Pakistani dispute resolution initiatives and chances. The study is anchored on comparative analysis, descriptive and case study method, with a core hypothesis that, while recognising the primary role of Indo-Pakistani leadership in the peace process, resolving Kashmir discord goes beyond strict establishment-based bilateralism and requires recognising and adopting a three-level approach: international, bilateral and multilateral/local. The first one includes the international community, the third embraces the representative inclusion of all chunks of the erstwhile Princely State in the peace process. The overall assumptions formed around in the subsequent chapters are as follows: (a) combative India's and Pakistan's policies serve only narrow beneficiaries and are crafted against the general interests of Indian and Pakistani citizens; (b) the animosities, artificially constructed and politicised by South Asian neighbours adversely affect the chances for beneficial bilateral and regional cooperation, indirectly foster democratic backsliding and provide framework for thriving political adherence to religiously motivated hyper-nationalism; (c) the ruling elites in both states are confronted with an urgent need to reconceptualise their mutual approach and stance towards Kashmir and its indigenous inhabitants and reframe major geopolitical objectives to adjust them to the challenges of the 21st century; (d) the inalienable rights of all residents of the erstwhile PSJ&K should be regarded as an inseparable part of multitrack frameworks for reconciliation initiatives, processes and political debates referring to the potential conflict resolution and future status of all chunks of Kashmir; and (e) the policies vis-à-vis Kashmir and the human rights situation in Indian- and Pakistani-administered parts should receive more international attention and resolution of this protracted conflict should be regarded as one of the fundamental contemporary security challenges.