ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the implications of liberal peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War in 1989, focusing on the electoral inclusion of former armed opposition groups. In nearly all cases of civil wars ending in this era, armed opposition groups have been invited to form political parties, and the majority of armed opposition groups did so. Using a dataset that tracks rebel groups that form parties at the end of civil conflict and participate in electoral politics, this chapter shows that most such parties have accepted participation in electoral politics as an essential part of their political strategies and have continued to participate over time. Unfortunately, commitment to electoral politics does not mean that they are committed democrats. The chapter examines some of the African post-rebel parties in detail and shows that electoral politics enabled competing elites to manage conflict successfully in most cases, but that the electoral inclusion for these armed actors have rarely been transformative. These groups either gained power and became dominant ruling parties, remained marginal political actors, or returned to armed conflict.
