ABSTRACT
This chapter is about the constitutional foundations of markets in the Americas from a historical and comparative perspective. Constitutions often protect private property and, at the same time, establish democratic institutions that give structure to expressions of popular sovereignty, via the enactment of regulations. In many circumstances, the protection of private property and the enactment of regulations can be at odds with each other, especially when the latter places limits on the exercise of actions related to private property. In addition, the protection of private property can place stringent limits on the scope of laws and their regulation. The constitutional landscape of the Americas shows how this tension emerged and unfolded. Using the enactment of competition law regimes as a focal point for comparison, the chapter shows how between the 1890s and the 1950s the constitutional landscape in the United States, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico addressed the tension between protecting private property and regulating its exercise via competition law regimes. While the enactment of regulation limiting private property eventually prevailed over strong forms of constitutional protection of private property, it did so along different lines in the countries here considered, mostly because of the imprint of local constitutional politics.
